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HOW TO DEFINE THE LIMITS OF 
RESPONSIBILITY 
by CARLETON H. GRIFFIN 
We are living in a particularly difficult business environ-
ment. A combination of economic recession and severe 
inflation has brought widespread business failures and 
investor losses. But also significant is what has been 
exposed in their wake: a disturbing amount of improper 
conduct in the corporate world. 
It is perhaps not surprising to hear of misdeeds in such 
circumstances, or even the sheer volume and size of what 
has been discovered. Recent economic troubles have been 
pervasive and serious. But what is more noteworthy is the 
amount of collusive misconduct unearthed at high corpo-
rate levels. The greatest mischief, moreover, has not been 
mundane defalcations—where the perpetrator's benefits 
are direct. It has been the highly sophisticated manipula-
tion of accounting records and procedures to produce 
indirect benefits, through influencing stock prices or job 
status. Thus, we learn of not only the age-old problems of 
altered inventory records and fictitious vendors, but also 
such cooperative sleight-of-hand as hidden loan guaran-
tees and contributed capital masquerading as sales 
revenue. 
Backwash from the Watergate era has added another 
dimension—the revelation of substantial corporate 
political gifts which were "laundered" through fictitious 
expense classifications and disguised expenditures of 
currency. In many instances, these practices have appar-
ently been carried on for some time and are just now 
coming to light. 
The latest development—which followed the dramatic 
death leap by the chief executive of one of the nation's 
largest companies—is the burgeoning series of disclosures 
concerning payments made by multinational concerns in 
order to secure foreign business. These practices—whether 
bribes, kickbacks, or commissions—are at odds in varying 
degrees with US and foreign laws, as well as with business 
ethics. They are accomplished in much the same way as 
political gifts, though usually in a more complicated 
fashion. Their discovery has caused not only corporate 
embarrassment and the resignation or dismissal of some 
top executives—but also the closing down of operations in 
foreign lands. It has even triggered international crises. 
General economic ills and Watergate cannot explain all 
of these developments, although they have been substan-
tial factors. So too has the new tide of consumerism, which 
has focused attention on old misdeeds and made them new 
problems. And as fuzzy policies and their unenthusiastic 
administration have created a permissive atmosphere in 
business, competitive pressures have made it easy to 
rationalize that "it can't be really wrong if everyone else is 
doing it." Add computerized accounting to the size and 
complexity of many businesses, and you aggravate the 
problem—providing increasingly inviting opportunities for 
inventive minds to cloud the real nature of transactions. 
These developments are causing difficulties for a great 
many people. Investors have been damaged or feel threat-
ened. Regulatory officers are asserting their official 
concern. And there is a group in the middle—corporate 
board members and officers, together with independent 
auditors—who are being asked with increasing frequency 
such questions as: "Where were you when . . .?" "Why 
didn't you . . .?" "Who is going to cover my losses?" 
Auditors Challenged First 
To date, auditors have been the most beleaguered targets 
of such challenges. Their principal antagonists appear to be 
lawyers who make careers out of representing large groups 
of faceless investors in class action lawsuits. In the name of 
consumerism, these lawyers wield the threat of spectacu-
larly large claims, unhindered by any realistic responsi-
bility for the defendant's costs of protecting himself. The 
technical auditing and accounting issues involved, and the 
unpredictability of judge or jury in the event of carrying the 
case to trial, can make the threat of a staggering loss very 
real to the auditor-defendant, creating in turn great pres-
sure for an out-of-court compromise. And, unfortunately, 
the auditor's problem is compounded with distaste when 
he senses that the plaintiff's counsel is less interested in 
winning a court verdict for the claimed damages than in a 
settlement whose acceptability is measured by the size of a 
contingent legal fee. 
The courts are also adding to the legal difficulties of the 
auditor. For example, decisions in recent years indicate that 
a plaintiff suing an accountant under the federal securities 
laws probably needs to prove only that the financial state-
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ments in question were misleading and negligently 
audited. That is, in contrast with the ordinary requirements 
of proving a negligence case, it is not necessary for the 
plaintiff to establish his reliance on such statements. 
In another step, the courts have greatly expanded the 
breadth of people to whom CPAs are responsible for 
deficient actions. It now appears that in many states 
(and until recently under the federal securities laws), 
the auditor can be held liable to a large group of 
unknown third persons for mere negligence. This con-
trasts with the longstanding Ultramares rule that the 
accountant owed a duty to such parties only in case 
of reckless and wanton misconduct. 
To the extent these developments go, the courts 
have concluded that CPAs occupy a role akin to that 
of a guarantor of the financial statements with which 
they are associated. That is indeed a staggering 
burden to carry. 
The SEC is another source of concern to auditors. Appar-
ently it is uneasy about its ability to carry out its own 
policing role when mischief so abounds. Clearly it is 
attempting to use the independent accounting firms as its 
enforcement arm as much as possible. This is apparent in its 
strong assertions about the high duty of auditors to un-
cover embezzlements and financial misrepresentations 
during the ordinary course of an audit. In addition, the 
commission is attempting to make independent accoun-
ting firms public whistle blowers for matters far beyond 
their responsibility concerning financial statements. 
The most striking example of this pertains to illegal for-
eign payments. The SEC apparently expects the auditor 1) to 
disclose all illegality, irrespective of the magnitude of the 
transaction involved and its impact on the client's state-
ments, and 2) to disclose material transactions that are only 
suspected to be illegal. This responsibility would be par-
ticularly onerous for the auditor, since not even the SEC has 
developed any measurable standards defining the kinds of 
acts which it believes should be subject to disclosure. 
Although the focus of all of these challenges—by 
lawyers, the courts, and the SEC—has been largely con-
centrated on the independent auditor, the field is rapidly 
widening. Parallel responsibility is being pressed on cor-
porate directors and officers. They are being named as de-
fendants with increasing frequency by investors who have 
found in them an additional source of recoverable funds. 
Similarly, the SEC has recently charged several directors 
of one large company with failure to supervise adequately 
the management of that ill-fated enterprise. In another 
case, the commission has criticized outside directors for 
their failure to become informed about and exercise 
control over the accounting principles applied by a com-
pany whose financial statements were deemed to be false 
and misleading. The commission has also begun, through 
its enforcement powers, to require some directors to be re-
placed by persons who are responsible for mandated 
change in corporate policy. In doing so, it demonstrates its 
view of the duty a corporate board has to a broadly defined 
public. 
It would be fruitless and, to a large extent irresponsible, 
for auditors, directors, and corporate officers to attempt to 
hold their lines of responsibility to the narrower bounds of 
yesterday. Investors, the courts, and the general public are 
asserting themselves to the contrary—and must be heard. 
The Limits of Responsibility 
A realistic line must be drawn, however, in setting these 
new responsibilities. What is outside this line, and is be-
yond the limit of acceptability, is the following: 
Auditors as guarantors. Outside auditors can be viewed 
neither as quasi-guarantors of their client's financial 
statements nor as indemnifiers of investor losses. The en-
forcement of such a rule would soon eliminate the profes-
sion, No sensible person would remain in or enter public 
accounting if such risks were virtually limitless. Indeed, to 
defend itself against unmerited litigation, the profession 
needs to come up with a sensible way of minimizing the 
legal risk which an auditor can face. One method might be 
the statutory limitation on liability now being studied as a 
proposed amendment to the federal securities laws. 
Exposure of Illegal Corporate Acts. Auditors and cor-
porate directors cannot be expected to reveal to the 
investing world, or to its regulators, all illegal or otherwise 
questionable corporate acts regard/ess of the effect of such 
acts on a company's financial statements. Responsibility 
must be realistically confined to matters having a signifi-
cant impact on a company's financial affairs. 
O n the other hand, acceptable limits of responsibility 
include: 
Standards for corporate conduct. Directors and officers 
should be responsible for defining, with reasonable clarity, 
corporate standards of conduct for such transactions as po-
litical contributions and foreign payments. They should 
also take reasonable steps to enforce adherence to those 
standards. Their auditors, in turn, should be responsible for 
reviewing such standards and measuring compliance in the 
course of their professional work. 
Corporate duty to uncover fraud. Directors and officers 
should recognize that the prime duty to thwart and 
uncover fraudulent activity within the corporation rests 
upon themselves, not on their auditors. This calls for a 
strong commitment to sound internal controls and effec-
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tive internal auditing, both of which are subject to review 
and evaluation by the outside accountant. 
Auditing for illegal transactions. Auditors must recog-
nize their duty to take reasonable steps to uncover illegal or 
unauthorized transactions whenever doing so will have a 
material effect on the audited financial statements. Certain 
transactions—for example, collusive defalcations, or mis-
representations by management—may be impossible to 
detect, but the auditor cannot resign himself to non-dis-
covery because of the lack of an assured result. 
What Must an Auditor Do? 
Concerning his responsibility to discover illegal or un-
authorized transactions, what expanded procedure should 
an auditor follow? Given a particular client, and circum-
stance of time and place, he should first focus on likely 
areas of exposure, then design appropriate examination 
steps, and finally apply his professional skills thoroughly to 
the facts. Of course, detection of some wrongdoing may 
escape the best investigation possible. 
For example, in the wake of Watergate a great deal of 
attention has been focused by the press and the govern-
ment on domestic and foreign corporate influence pay-
ments. Under the circumstances, audit procedures which 
have not been customary in the past should be performed if 
additional conditions exist which raise a concern that cor-
porate management may have committed an illegal act. 
Such a presumption could arise, for example, if the cor-
poration has been a party to the kind of transactions that 
have received widespread public criticism in its particular 
industry or in foreign areas where the client operates. The 
transactions to be examined should be those that are ma-
terial to the financial statements. Particular scrutiny, of 
course, should be given in situations involving substantial 
consequences to the company, such as when the con-
tinuation of a material earnings stream appears to depend 
on the future conceal mentor repetition of the illegal acts in 
question. 
The essence of the auditor's conduct in such circum-
stances is to be alert to unusual internal and external factors 
which indicate a high likelihood of illegal or unauthorized 
transactions. Whether the concern be for illegal influence 
payments, defalcations, or financial misrepresentations, 
the auditor's approach and attitude should be funda-
mentally the same—that of making a thorough profes-
sional investigation. 
No matter what form they may ultimately take, the bur-
geoning duties of the auditor are becoming substantial 
indeed. Taking on those duties in a world poised to claim 
malperformance only intensifies the seriousness of his re-
sponsibility. Clearly, to meet the challenge, a public ac-
counting firm must give the closest possible attention to the 
quality of its work. 
A Logical Proposal 
Quality requires not only recruiting able people and up-
dating their training; it also requires continuous eval-
uation of the firm's policies and procedures, the correc-
tion of any deficiencies, and the adoption of improved 
techniques. But while this has been carried on by many 
firms for many years—with each firm reviewing its work 
internally—the day has now come when it is apparent that 
these internal audits must be supplemented by the en-
gagement of qualified people from the outside. 1 am refer-
ring to "peer reviewers." The profession's new exposure to 
liability makes this extra measure of objective quality 
control imperative. The public will no longer accept the 
strictly private self-discipline we have been practicing on 
ourselves. Clearly, just as other professions have improved 
the quality of their service in this way, so can auditors as 
they strive to fulfill their obligations to the public. 
What is actually being done within the profession today 
in keeping with expanded audit responsibility and im-
proved quality control procedures? Speaking for this firm, 
our auditing effort has been augmented over the past two 
years by a substantial set of guidelines which attempt to 
ferret out fraudulent transactions, particularly where cor-
porate management is involved in material transactions. 
These guidelines are now being amplified to cover the 
broader area of illegal corporate payments, reflecting that 
newly arising set of problems. In addition, the principle of 
peer review is embodied in a present commitment to 
expose the firm's policies and procedures to a team of out-
side auditors. These actions are positive steps toward one 
firm's faithful discharge of its duty to clients and to the 
public. 
Conclusion 
The days are difficult. New duties are being thrust upon 
many people. The independent auditor has been increas-
ingly made aware of this reality for several years, and cor-
porate directors and officers are becoming similarly 
exposed. It is easy for all of us to react with indignation and 
profess an inability to assume a higher duty. Some of the 
newly defined responsibilities do seem clearly impossible 
to assume, but others would satisfy reasonable public ex-
pectations which can and should be met. The essential 
problems are to determine which of those new duties 
should be assumed and then earnestly to pursue them. 
Otherwise, we may find somebody else on the job. a 
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